Articles

Political Islam and Democracy

Paper presented by
Nawal al Saadawi and Sherif Hetata

Conference on Religion and Democracy,
Mansfield College
Oxford
10-12 September 1999

Since the collapse of the Soviet union and the end of the Cold War there has been an increasing interest in matters related to religion in academic circles. Academic conferences on religion have become a frequent occurrence, and we have attended quite a number. All of them without exception were about Islam. Only a few months ago we were in Edinburgh University attending a conference on Islam and Development in Africa . Each time we have asked the same question: Why when dealing with religion is there this emphasis on Islam, on the Islamic revival, on Islamic fundamentalism ? Why is it that the other monothestic religions like Christianity or Judaism receive little attention?

The revival of religion and the growth of fundamentalism which we have witnessed over the last quarter of a century or so is not limited to Islam. We taught together at Duke University in North Carolina for four years and became familiar with related developments in American society, with the increasing strength and influence of the Christian Fundamentalist movement, and of “Political Christianity”, the growth of the Christian coalition to a membership of over two million, its political alliance with the Republican party, its expanding base in the economy, in education (schools), in culture, and in the media, with the activities of the Baptist movement, the pressures exerted by it to re-introduce prayers, and abolish the teaching of Darwin, in schools to ban abortion and close down abortion clinics often by violent means, and with the development of what has come to be known in the USA as the Bible belt.

We worked in India for a number of years. There too religious fundamentalism has developed rapidly over the last two decades amongst Muslims, Sikhs and Hindus and today a Hindu fundamentalist government is in power.

In the region of the world where we live political Islam and Muslim fundamentalism have gained in strength but in addition across the border from Egypt, in Israel, the Jewish fundamentalism movement has become a prominent force in Israeli life.

Every day we can observe how similar to one another these movements are in the religious ideas and practices they propagate, in the rigid backwardness of their thought, in the way they act.

The growth of politically active religious movements, of religious fundamentalism is almost universal, and this conference will be discussing aspects related to the three religions Islam, Judaism and Christianity. In the past years the concentration on Islam has often served the political aims of ruling circles in the West. In addition it tends to obscure the role played by the religious revival, and by religious fundamentalism in our post-modern world, in maintaining and reinforcing the free market, and the political and economic system promoted by global multi-national capitalism.

The cultural atmosphere prevailing in Egypt today is very different from that which we knew at the end of Nasser’s rule (1970) and even before under King Farouk. A few years ago we moved to a populous district of Cairo called Shoubra. The majority of people living in this district are Copts (that is Christians) but from the tens of mosques scattered around our building microphones blare out the Islamic call to prayer five times a day. The first call is at dawn, the last one and a half hours after nightfall. The calls to prayer may be preceded by half to one hour sermons delivered in a thunderous voice through the same microphones with promises of Paradise and Allah’s mercy, or threats of eternal Hell fire. When we go up in the lift to our flat located on the twenty sixth floor if we ask one of the occupants which button to press for him, he will answer “If Allah wills I will go up to the tenth floor” meaning that the slightest move made by a human being is ordained by God, and God might have decided to stop the lift, or make it drop, or give one of us a heart attack. On the days in which we drive to our small village house 125 kilometers north of Cairo we meet flocks of young girls going off to school or coming back their heads enveloped in ample veils of white cotton cloth. Before coming to this conference we spent ten days on the North West Coast. Every day we walked at dawn and swam before sunset in the turquoise blue waters of the Mediterranean sea. Women and young girls on the beach also plunged into the sea but fully dressed, under the watchful eyes of a husband, a father, an uncle, or a spouse. In the morning newspaper a reader wanted to know whether a Muslim could accept a blood transfusion from a Copt to which the Sheikh who deals with religious matters answered “only if there is no alternative by which we can save his life”. On the pavements of Cairo thousands of books popularizing conservative religious ideas about women and other matters and propagating superstitious beliefs, or faith in miracles, or magic or sorcery lie side by side with pornographic magazines and pamphlets on sex. Television and radio broadcasts devote hours to religious programs, serials, plays and talks. During the past year more than eighty books have been censored or seized as a result of direct intervention or pressure from Al Azhar the official theological authority in Egypt. If you write a letter or give a talk without pronouncing the ritualistic opening phrase “In the name of Allah the most Merciful and Forgiving” you can be sure that ninety nine times out of a hundred in the audience there will be a small click, a quick glance at the feet or a short holding of the breath.

In the last two years after the government struck out successfully at the more fanatical religious terrorist groups the atmosphere has improved. The bullets have been stopped, but the same conservative religious cultural atmosphere largely prevails except amongst the Westernized upper or middle class groups most of whom manage to combine a religious ritualism with a consumer culture. This in a country known for its religious tolerance and for an easy going pragmatic attitude towards religion in every-day life.

The danger of the “cultural change” and its impact on democratic attitudes and practices in private and public life cannot be minimized. If people believe in obedience to God, to the patriarch (father, husband, elder…etc.), in fate and destiny then autocratic, authoritarian ideas and systems will flourish. People become their own police, accept chains or even create them.

A religious revival, a cultural change of this scope and nature has had many implications. One of them is the growth of active fundamentalist movements, a greater activity and out-reach of politico-religious movements.

It seems paradoxical that a cultural change of this nature should take place in many parts of the world including Egypt at the beginning of the third millenium. Why at this stage, in our post-modern world should we be faced with a revival of religious fundamentalism which in some ways takes us back to the Middle Ages. If this revival was limited in nature, if it did not involve many countries in the world and most of its religions we could have sought the reasons for it in causes related to specific situations. But since (together with racial, ethnic and nationalistic fundamentalisms) it is universal in nature, then the causes themselves are to be sought in global changes.

Why are we witnessing this growth of Islamic, (and Coptic) fundamentalism in Egypt, why the increasing influence of anti-democratic politico-religious movements called by some scholars an Islamic revival?

The “cultural change” characterized by the growth of Islamic fundamentalism in Egypt is an integral part of our post-modern era, of the changes that have affected all countries, and all peoples, of developments in multi-national global capitalism. It is a reaction to the socio-economic crisis of the so-called free market, to the lack of perspectives for the future, to the sufferings, the insecurity, the economic difficulties, the lack of opportunities for youth, the unemployment, the loss of hope amongst people. In this worsening situation people have sought comfort in God, in what is familiar and simple and gives easy explanations. Having lost faith in the system and in the rulers who lead us, in the belief that they wish to change things and will find a way out, a return to God has become the alternative, and a growing number of people have turned to the fundamentalist movement as the instrument through which God will make changes.

The defeat suffered by Egypt in the 1967 war and the end of the hopes placed in Nasser’s revolution, followed by his death and replacement by Sadat opened a new era, an era in which the popular gains achieved under Nasser were liquidated, in which under Sadat neo-colonial powers headed by the USA gained economic and political domination over Egypt. It is the era, in which the multinationals and the World Bank have implemented policies of structural adjustment for the developing countries of Latin America, Africa and part of Asia, an adjustment which has made the majority composed of poor people poorer and the small minority of rich richer.

The “religious revival” and the growth of Islamic fundamentalism has also been a retrograde “cultural reaction” against the “West” perceived as being responsible for the increasing woes of people. But while the “West” is pointed out as the “cultural enemy” the economic ties between fundamentalist forces and movements and transnational capital have become closer and closer. Fundamentalism remains an integral part of capitalist globalization. Globalization centralizes and concentrates capital at the top, in the hands of the few. Fundamentalism helps to maintain the power and control of global capital by dividing people at the bottom on a religious basis. It has been used by global capital to foment religious strife, between Muslims and Copts in Egypt, to exert pressure on the government when it is not as obedient as the United States would want, to send trained guerillas to Afghanistan and other places to lead the daily struggle for democratic freedoms and rights astray.

Tens of millions of Egyptians who migrated during the past decades in order to work in the oil rich Gulf countries have been influenced by the extremely conservative religious societies in which they spent years of their life. They have developed an economic and cultural affinity with the sources of their new found welfare and often wealth. In cooperation with the ruling families of the Gulf countries policy makers in the United States, Britain, France and Germany have helped in setting up Muslin fundamentalist networks, harboured and protected their leaders, given them financial, military , logistic and technical help to serve their political ends inside and outside the region. The conservative theocratic regimes in the oil rich Arab countries draw their main support from governments and multi-nationals in the “West” and would be unable to survive without this support.

Successive Egyptian governments have encouraged and cooperated with the fundamentalist movement for long periods of time. Religious conservatism has permitted them to mislead people, to accept their fate, engage in strife instead of uniting for change. Fundamentalist movements have been used to halt the growth of liberal, national democratic, or left wing political and social forces and religious fundamentalism has become an integral part of the economic, political and cultural structure in the country and of the system of control. Despite differences related to “culture” it would not have been possible to impose the policies of the World Bank without the growing influence it has exercised over the way people think. It was Sadat who opened the door to “free market” policies, to the United States, and to the explosive growth of the fundamentalist movement during the seventies. But when the fundamentalist leaders started to steal towards power they clashed with him using the Camp David agreement with Israel as an excuse. On the 6 October, 1980 he was assassinated by members of the armed forces at a military parade. They belonged to a fundamentalist group called “Al Gihad” (meaning “Holy Combat”, or Struggle).

The “Gihad” was a splinter group which differed with and broke away from the “Moslem Brotherhood”. It accused the latter of not being “radical” enough. All the “terrorist groups” which appeared on the scene successively during the past years have been off-shoots of the main fundamentalist movement with a mass following known as the “Moslem Brotherhood”. This is seen by some analysts as a new division of labour imposed by the continuing failure of the “Moslem Brotherhood” to size power. In this new division of labour the “terrorist groups” undertake the task of “destabilization” while the “Moslem Brotherhood” moves towards power by strengthening its mass support, and playing the electoral game.

To speak or to write about “Political Islam and Democracy” in Egypt is to speak or write about the “Moslem Brotherhood”. The second sector of importance in political Islam is the official, establishment, or government sector of political Islam constituted by the theological University of “Al Azhar”, the Ministry of Wakfs, the religious Sheikhs and Imams and a network of around 90,000 mosques as well as schools, prisons and prayer corners spread all over the country. In other words by the complex politics religious structure born more than a thousand years ago. The two sectors are not strictly separated for their linkages are manifold. Nevertheless we will not deal with official government Islam which has adapted itself to the semi-secular interests and policies of successive governments in Egypt. It is the Moslem Brotherhood which is the more political the less “theological” or “clerical”, and by far the most militant and popular of the two. It is also the movement which is competing for power in the present set-up.

The Moslem Brotherhood was founded in 1924 by Hassan al-Banna, a school teacher who studied in Al-Azhar University and Dar al-Ouloum the college from which teachers of Arabic graduated. He started his “da’awa” or preachings in the city of Ismaileya head quarters of the Anglo-French Suez Canal Company and advanced command of the British occupational forces. This detail indicates its close links with colonial circles right from the start.

In 1932 the headquarters of the Muslim Brotherhood were moved to “Helmeya al Guedida” a populous district in Cairo. Its third congress held in 1935 laid down the basic tenets of the movement. The Moslem Brotherhood was described as “The Islamic Movement” meaning that only those who belonged to it could be considered “real” Muslims, that it was the only authentic representative of Islam, thus denying all other institutions or movements their true Islamic character. It was declared a social non-political organization but its members were not allowed to adhere to any other organization, a ruling clearly in contradiction with its alleged non-political aims. It did not seek to define a clear platform or program apart from the general principles of Islam, and the need for a moral reform of society. This left the supreme guide Hassan al Banna free to decide on all matters without making him accountable for any decisions he might take. It also meant a blind obedience and submission on the part of all members to his directives and commands.

During the Second World war the Brotherhood grew rapidly and by the year 1940 had over two million members and two thousands branches scattered all over the country, an armed militia, 10,000 mosques partially, or wholly under its control, a network of social services including, clinics, hospitals and schools as well as hundreds of small or middle size economic enterprizes run by its members, including printing presses, publication houses and a newspaper.

This rapid expansion of its activities was facilitated by several factors. The economic difficulties faced by people during the Second World War, and the social unsecurity in a changing situation encouraged many people especially belonging to the lower and middle classes in society to seek refuge in a religious movement. The British colonialists were perceived as the main cause of the worsening situation, of inflation, and rising prices. The rhetoric of the Muslim Brotherhood against these “foreigners” won support for their cause. On the other hand the colonialists did not consider this religions movement as a threat. On the contrary it could be used as an instrument when the need arose, as a fundamentally autocratic force replacing nationalism with Islam, of democracy with blind obedience, and unification with religious strife. Right from the start the British occupation forces, the palace, the Egyptian police and successive governments with the exception of the Wafd (the main secular democratic and national party of the people) encouraged the movement and gave it financial as well as other forms of support[1].

In 1946 at the university and schools the Muslim Brotherhood countered the slogans raised for national independence and democracy by a broad front including most of the political parties, student organizations and Trade Unions, women’s groups and cultural clubs with slogans against alcohol, “material values” and moral corruption. People they said should obey their ruler King Farouk and worship Allah. “Allah is great” was their battle cry and to impress this on people’s minds they beat up those who did not agree with them with iron chains and long curved knives called “gazelle horns”. By 1945 the Brotherhood had built up an armed militia of 47,000 young men who sometimes paraded through the streets of cities with lighted torches in a show of force. In 1948 just before the movement was disbanded this “militia” called “boy scouts” had reached 75,000 with a well-organized core command, training camps and weapon stores.

To understand the “ideology” of this movement. It might be appropriate to quote some of the ideas formulated by Hassan al Banna at the time.

- Science and art have progressed. Riches have grown and the land has become greener, attractive to the eyes. But does that mean that we know peace when we lie in our beds, and that the tears have ceased to drop from our eyes.

- Foreign legislation has not solved any of our problems. These can only be solved if we apply “Shariat” (religious jurisprudence)[2].

- All parties should be abolished. The struggle between parties is a negative thing. We have only one leader and he is the Prophet. We should refuse all Western ideas including democracy. All our ideas should come from Islam. However we can take certain things from the West but only in the following areas:

- Islam is worship and leadership, religion and state, spirituality and action, prayer and militancy (holy struggle), obedience and ruling, Koran and Sword.

- Our system of government should be the Caliphate. It is the only system acceptable to us. It combines political and religious rule in the Calyph with no separation.

The Arab Israeli war of 1948 enabled the Muslim Brotherhood to strengthen its political influence by capitalizing on its stand against the creation of the Israeli State and the participation of its “Volunteers” in the war. At the same time it was able to collect more arms, and expand, as well as train the members of its militia and military leadership. It prepared to take over power. Nokrachi Paslia the Prime Minister of Egypt, leader of the feudo-capitalist Saadist Party and a close collaborator with the King outlawed the movement. The Muslim Brotherhood retaliated by assassinating him and six months later Hassan al Banna the Supreme Guide of the movement was shot by members of the secrete police on the streets of Cairo. He was replaced by Ahmed Al Hodeibi a judge in the Court of Appeal with close links to the palace in an attempt to improve relations with the King.

In July 1952, the Free Offices movement came to power. In the beginning the Muslim Brotherhood tried to exercise a leading role and gradually take complete control over the revolution, but Nasser was determined to follow an independent path. In 1954 negotiations started with the British for an eventual withdrawal of the British forces occupying Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood after some time started secret talks with the British as a part of a pressure game on the new regime, but also in an attempt to present themselves as an alternative force with which the British could reach agreement. Nasser cracked down on the movement, jailed its leaders and hundreds of its followers. In the summer of 1955 members of the movement tried to assassinate him while he was addressing over a quarter of a million people gathered in the huge al- Mansheya Square in Alexandria.

Followed long periods of imprisonment which lasted over ten years. But meanwhile within the movement change was taking place. This was the development of a more fanatic radical wing which manifested itself in the successive breakaway of different splinter groups, composed of young men and women with a strong base in the University, in South Egypt, and amongst semi-educated groups.

The spiritual leader and ideologist of this group was a man named Sayd Kotb. He was the radical successor of Hassan al Banna, the product of different factors including the successive failures, persecutions and imprisonments through which the Muslim Brotherhood had to live. For Sayed Kotb the society was living a period similar to the one preceding the advent of Islam, known to Islamic scholars as “al-Gahileya” which means the era of “Darkness and ignorance”. This society and the people in it were heretical non-believers. It had to be destroyed by an Islamic force, this would permit re-instituting the absolute rule of Allah and imposing it on all aspects of life. Only those who participated in the creation of this force were true believers. They had to accept absolute submission to Allah in everything they did. All other people were heretics to be destroyed unless they joined the ranks of this unique Islamic movement called “al Gam’aa al Islameya”.

When Sadat came to power at the end of September 1970 he quickly emerged as a ruler who had different views and represented different interests to those of Nasser, and his supporters.

To implement his policies he had to overcome those who opposed him because they believed in national independence and an economy geared to satisfy the basic needs of people. Under the guise of a multi party system and a new liberalism, and after naming himself “al Raiss al Moumin” which means the “President Believer” he reverted to the old game of encouraging and supporting the Islamic political movement, to counterbalance and overcome the opposition composed of Nasserites, and different national progressive and left wing movements.

Once again the followers of the Islamic political movement started to surface, the young men bearded, the women wearing the veil. Their slogans “Allah is Great” or “Islam is the Solution” reappeared on the walls, on taxis and cars, posters and stickers, or were shouted out through hundreds of microphones. But once again when they grew strong they started to steal towards power. A favourable moment seemed the Camp David Peace Treaty unpopular with many people and to which they declared open opposition. But on the 5 September 1981 Sadat arrested 1536 members of the opposition the majority of whom belonged to the Muslim politico-religious movement. One month later militants of this movements assassinated him during a military parade held in commemoration of the “victory” against Israel in the war of 1973.

Released from jail by his successor “Moubarak” they resumed their activities, growing more powerful everyday. But to many of the young members the “Moslem Brotherhood” seemed to have grown old, lost its vigour, become too mild. The Iranian revolution had entered on the scene as a new factor. Events in the Sudan, in Algeria, in Afghanistan involvement with the CIA, all played their role.

Over the years the pattern of the movement had changed. It became characterized by a greater sophistication and complexity coupled with an increasing tendency to resort to violent methods. Violence has always been a part of the ideology and action of the movement but now it seemed to have split into violent and non-violent groups. On the one hand there were numerous extremist hard core groups, some of them quite small, mushrooming or growing like a grape vine, so that if one was destroyed it was replaced by others existing or newly born[3] which all propagated, doctrinaire terrorist teachings. On the other the main bulk with a mass following remained the Moslem Brotherhood, an ostensibly more moderate mainstream no longer engaged in terrorist activities. Learning from past experience it was now making use of the multi-party system and elections equated by Western ruling circles to a democratic system playing the electoral game to get into parliament, or local government to gain control of professional, cultural, trade union, and social organizations. It was also moving more and more into the media (newspapers, T.V., radio, publishing houses, continuing to work hard at setting up a network of health, educational and other services, using the thousands of mosques more effectively, infiltrating into the judiciary, banks and economic enterprises, making use of the considerable resources and high level connections at its disposal especially in the Gulf countries.

As a result of these developments, the roles were now nicely divided between the moderate “mainstream” movement and the small radical terrorist groups. While the terrorist groups threw the bombs at Presidents, ministers, high level civil and police authorities intimidated or assassinated intellectuals, killed tourists and disrupted the economy by creating an atmosphere of insecurity and showing that “democracy” was a failure, the mainstream movement could steal towards power step by step. It no longer needed a militia, or a military wing. Others probably supported by it in different ways, off-shoots of the big brotherhood could do the job for it while it presented a moderate face for all to see, and appeared as the savior of society from the fanatical Muslims, as the only force capable of putting an end to all the chaos and destruction. To these ends it used the language of religion, of God, of morality exposing the corruption of Arab governments, standing up as the opponent of Western encroachment on the norms, traditions, values, and interests of the people. It capitalized on the protest movement of people harassed by poverty, unemployment, and the heavy hand of governments who protected the rich and had failed to implement any policies that would make their situation easier, and who applying the polices of the World Bank and the International Money Fund were making the poor poorer and the rich richer.

But the time came when those in power had to intervene or else step down. It was Moubarak’s turn to crack down first on the terrorist groups which were the immediate threat, then on the Muslim Brotherhood. So now the situation lives an uneasy equilibrium and future developments may depend on whether Western ruling circles? will need an Islamic alternative. For the time being they have moved away from what seemed under consideration sometime ago, since the more secular systems in Egypt or Algeria are less unpredictable than the backward and narrow minded movements of political Islam. Nevertheless amongst these movements more modern, open minded and younger leaderships have developed slowly over the years and so one day they may be looked upon as an alternative if things go wrong under present regimes, or if they “lose face” as we say in our part of the world.

Within the Moslem Brotherhood this process of modernization has been accompanied by limited democratic changes in the mentality and attitudes of its protagonists who belong to new generations of the movement. However these changes remain extremely limited. In addition a small number of Islamic intellectuals and professionals have sought to introduce more liberal interpretations of Islam. Nevertheless these developments continue to be of a minor nature the absence of democratic changes and an influential democratic movement within the society as a whole. This does not mean that the Islamic political movements cannot develop one or other form of liberation theology similar to some of the movements which have developed in the West, but all these trends will tend to affect only a minor sector of the political religious movement as long as the present balance of forces is maintained not only in our region but also in the rest of the world. All religions are political in nature and the direction in which they evolve depends very much on the socio-economic structures and trends within which they operate.

The third and final section of this paper will deal briefly with the teachings of the Moslem Brotherhood on the status and role of women in society. It will confine itself to some of the positions and ideas which reflect the attitudes and position of the movement towards women. It will not deal with the impact of the politico-religious movement on the situation and rights of women. During the past two decades or so there have been plethora of books, publications, studies, doctoral theses, papers and articles in the West often politically motivated the situation of women in Muslim and especially Arab countries, and this is not the subject of our conference.

During and after the Second World War, Hassan al Banna was in the habit of giving a weekly talk every Tuesday evening at his headquarters. The meetings were held on the spacious roof of the three storey building painted pure white with dark brown doors and shutters minutely carved in Arab Islamic designs. They were open to young men and women who flocked to hear him speak in his rambling rhetorical style about Islam and the aims of the Moslem Brotherhood. The young women were always veiled even at that time where there was not a single veiled female student in the University and they sat in a corner to one side. If one of these young people moved by what he had heard decided to join the Brotherhood he was taken down to a small room to meet Hassan al Banna and be sworn in. The ceremony consisted in an oath taken over the Koran and a pistol lying side by side on a table.

The basic tenets of Islam on which Hassan al Banna insisted when dealing with the Brotherhoods position on women may be summarized as follows:

This position has remained central in the ideology of the Brotherhood. However with the education of women (40-45% in all schools, university colleges) and the numbers of women who go out every day to work more liberal trends have made their way although with the fundamentalist backlash of recent years, and the growing economic crisis more and more voices are being raised to maintain that a woman’s place is in the home.

The Muslim Brotherhood like all religions fundamentalist groups insists on the inferior status of women. But in all religions women are not equal to men, and it is the changes in society that make the difference.

Because women do not constitute a strong political force they suffer more than men from the vicissitudes of economic and political changes. They are the first victims of the economic crisis, of the attack on fundamental human rights and democracy, and the first victims of the politico-religious movement which has spread to many countries of the world.

(1) Tagroubit Misr al Liberaleya. Egypt’s Experience of Liberalism, 1922-1936.

(2) Al Ikhwan al Muslimoun fi Mizan al Hak. The Muslim Brotherhood and the Balance of Truth, 1964.

(9) Houkouk al Maráa Bayna al Mawatheek al Dawleya wal Haraka al Islameya. Women’s rights in International Conventions and in the Islamic Political Movement.

A paper by Omar Karay presented to the Cairo Centre for the Defence of Human rights, June 1999.

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[1] The Suez Canal Company is known to have given generous donations to Hassan al Banna especially in the early years.

[2] Known to be extremely anti-democratic and against women. Includes cutting off the hand of those who steal, stoning a woman who commits adultery.

[3] Examples of the most important are “al Gam’aa al Islameya, al Gihad (responsible for the assassination of al-Sadat” “al Takfer Wal Higra”, “al Nagoun Min al Nar”.